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Resumo
A introdu¸ c˜ ao de programa¸ c˜ ao linear e fun¸ c˜ ao de perda quadr´ atica em economia
monet´ aria nos anos 1960 imprimiu marcas no intenso debate sobre o instrumento de
pol´ ıtica monet´ aria ´ otimo. Tais m´ etodos foram amplamente utilizados em outras ´ areas
do conhecimento por tornarem simples as solu¸ c˜ oes para problemas complexos, algo prin-
cipalmente importante se considerados os computadores da ´ epoca. Este argumento ´ e
tamb´ em apresentado para explicar sua ado¸ c˜ ao em economia monet´ aria. Em tal narra-
tiva, Henri Theil e Herbert Simon s˜ ao cita¸ c˜ oes recorrentes por suas provas do princ´ ıpio
de “equivalente certeza”. Este trabalho argumenta que a caracteriza¸ c˜ ao do compor-
tamento dos bancos centrais atrav´ es de fun¸ c˜ oes de perda quadr´ aticas inaugurou um
modo uniforme e objetivo de se discutir pol´ ıticas ´ otimas, o que estabilizou tal discurso.
Para se compreender melhor este processo, ´ e necess´ ario analisar como tais fun¸ c˜ oes
originaram-se na literatura de “operations research” e “management science” ` as quais
Modigliani e Simon contribuiram. A tese aqui sustentada ´ e a de que solu¸ c˜ oes simples
eram apenas um dos atrativos a explicar o amplo uso de fun¸ c˜ oes de perda quadr´ aticas
em economia monet´ aria.
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Abstract
The introduction of linear-quadratic methods in monetary economics in the 1960s
tinged the intense debate about the optimal monetary policy instrument. These meth-
ods were widely used outside monetary economics because they delivered easy solutions
to complex stochastic models. This same reason explains the success of quadratic loss
functions according to the conventional wisdom among monetary economists. In this
traditional narrative, Henri Theil and Herbert Simon are often cited by their proofs
that models with quadratic objective functions have the certainty equivalence property.
This attribute made the solution of these models feasible for the computers available
at that time. This paper shows how the use of a quadratic loss function to characterize
the behavior of central banks inaugurated an objective or uniform way of talking about
optimality. In this respect, the discourse on optimal monetary policy stabilized. More-
over, a richer account of the quadratic approach to monetary policy debate emerges
by analyzing how quadratic loss functions were used in operations research and man-
agement problems by groups of scientists that included economists like Modigliani and
Simon. I argue that feasibility is only one important factor that explains the wide
popularity of quadratic functions in monetary economics.
Keywords: quadratic loss function, optimal monetary policy, certainty equivalence, Henri Theil,
Herbert Simon
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1 Introduction
In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman and the so called monetarists veered the debate about policy-
making away from the prescriptions of aggregate demand management based on ﬁscal instruments.
The propose to rely mostly on monetary policy to achieve low inﬂation and stable growth was part
of an intense controversy among economists and policymakers.
In this contest, several issues were intertwined. For example, questions about the stability
over time of the money demand function, about which instruments the monetary authority should
use to conduct monetary policy (should it be a price, interest rate, or should it be a quantity,
a monetary aggregate?), concerns about the lags of monetary and ﬁscal policies, about the way
economic policy should be conducted (following rules or in a discretionary fashion; adjusting the
instruments gradually or not), among others, all pervaded theoretical and policy-oriented discussions
at that time.
At the same time, new mathematical methods designed to improve the decision-making process
in operational research and management problems were brought to monetary economics, shaping
the discussion on optimal monetary policy. This paper is concerned with the particular notion of
“optimality” that emerged out of the above mentioned debate in the U.S. circa the 1960s.
In order to implement an “optimal” monetary policy, it is necessary to characterize its “optimal”
instrument. In spite of seeming a trivial technical task, the speciﬁcation of the “optimal” instrument
was, on the contrary, a source of a wide contention among economists and policy makers in the 1960s,
involving all sorts of arguments. In this debate, there were three main positions taken by diﬀerent
groups of economists, as described by Poole (1970).
To have a better idea on how intensely the “instrument problem” was debated in the 1960s and
also how far it was from coming to an end, the words of Alan Holmes (in Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston (1969, page 65)), Senior Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, are
illustrative:
“The debate over whether the Federal Reserve should rely exclusively on the money stock
–somehow deﬁned– as an indicator or a target of monetary policy, or both, continues unabated.
While the debate has shed some light on the role of money in monetary policy and the role
of monetary policy in the overall mix of policies that aﬀect the real economy, there has been
perhaps as much heat as light. And the light that is being generated from the many research
studies that have stemmed from the debate is very often dim indeed.”
Instead of identifying the members of each of the previously identiﬁed groups and making a
genealogical account of each of the three positions outlined before, the present paper takes those
groups and standpoints as the background for discussing a particular notion of optimality that
arose among monetary economists circa 1960, with the use of a quadratic loss function1. The
paper also shows that this concept of optimality was used to support diﬀerent arguments on the
“instrument contest.” More speciﬁcally, it analyzes how the use of a quadratic loss function became
a widespread and consensual way for talking about optimality of monetary policy among otherwise
divergent economists involved in policymaking, like the monetarists and their opponents like Franco
Modigliani, James Tobin, Paul Samuelson, and Arthur Okun.
In order to construct a more comprehensive history of the quadratic loss function it is crucial to
recognize that it is an episode on the more general movement towards formalization of economics,
the increasing use of stochastic dynamic methods, and the consolidation of neoclassicism in the
1For a broader picture of the American monetary thought, see Mehrling in Morgan and Rutherford (1998, pages
293-306).
1post World War II period. Diﬀerent aspects of these processes are discussed by several papers in
Morgan and Rutherford (1998) and by Klein (2000, 2005), Mirowski (2002), and Weintraub (2002).
Dynamic programming problems were not only related to gunners in aircrafts facing moving targets,
but also to scheduling tasks so to perform them in the minimum time possible, among several other
examples, as presented in the second section of this paper. I shall argue that this latter problem is
more relevant for understanding the meaning and usage of the expression “loss function” in monetary
economics. The third section introduces the main economists who contributed to the introduction
of a quadratic loss function in the monetary policy debate of the 1960s, for whom Simon (1956) and
Theil (1957, 1964) are important references. This historical account is contrasted to the perceptions
of the quadratic loss function among monetary economists. Finally, concluding remarks close the
paper.
2 A quadratic world outside monetary economics
The urge for planning strategic decisions was one of the characteristics of the period around World
War II. This period witnessed an outburst of linear-quadratic methods and electronic computers to
deal with various kinds of decision problems. A common characteristic to all these problems was
the necessity to economize resources in designing strategies to achieve a desired goal.
Another characteristic of this period was that choices under uncertainty became a central issue to
decision makers in general and to economists in particular2. As a consequence, parsimonious models
were desirable not because they were more “elegant” in theoretical terms, whatever that means,
but because they required less information to be known a priori by decision makers. The crucial
advantage of linear-quadratic models, in this sense, was to be parsimonious in a very convenient
way: in providing easy solutions to complex models, which in turn, could be computed by hand of
by the computers available at that time.
In the 1950s, the scope of application of linear methods expanded from military needs to a
broader audience of social scientists (economists included), mathematicians and engineers involved
in several non-military problems like how to schedule diﬀerent tasks so to minimize the time spent
on them, what is “the most economical way of transporting materials between various sources and
destinations” (Smith Jr. (1956, page 156)), how to distribute the diﬀerent types of eﬀorts expended
on given tasks to obtain the maximum desired result, or how to produce, hire workers, and manage
inventories so to “optimally” respond to uncertain demanded quantities, especially for highly seasonal
products like heating oil.
As I shall show later, the notion of optimality developed in this period was closely related to
economizing resources and information and was practically implemented by postulating decision
makers who minimized quadratic “loss functions.”
The mentioned widening of the scope of linear-quadratic methods from military circles to social
sciences, to business and to the government was part of an increasing employment of mathematics
in these diﬀerent areas of human action. Linear programming provided a convenient way of com-
bining three features of decision making, following Smith Jr. (1956), perceived as desired in that
period: model building (i.e., having an “appropriate” representation of the situation being studied),
mathematics (i.e., the tools for manipulating the model), and computation (how to actually carry
out the model manipulation).
In the 1950s and early 1960s the research projects on dynamic programming and on quadratic
“loss functions” were carried out in many institutions, among of them the RAND Corporation
(with Richard Bellman), the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Carnegie Mellon University, since
19673; with Franco Modigliani, Herbert Simon, William Cooper, Charles Holt and their graduate
2This connection is explored by Klein (2000, 2005) and Mirowski (2002).
3The Carnegie Technical Schools were founded in 1900 by the industrialist Andrew Carnegie. In 1912, it changed
its name to Carnegie Institute of Technology (CIT). In the interwar period, by designing interdisciplinary research
2students, John F. Muth and Albert Ando, among many others), the Cowles Commission (with Jacob
Marschak, Kenneth Arrow, besides Simon and Modigliani as research consultants in the early 1950s),
and the Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands (with Henri Theil) stand out in the narrative
of the present paper. Among the sponsors of those research projects we ﬁnd mainly the Oﬃce of
Naval Research (ONR)4 and the Department of Air Force, in the United States.
The group of scientists in the newly created Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA,
in 1949) at Carnegie Institute of Thechnology, with ﬁnancial support of the ONR, is key to the
present narrative, as explored later. The GSIA was an important institution in the network of a
diverse group of economists, mathematicians, and the new generations of operations researchers and
management scientists. The group at GSIA also interacted with the researches at Cowles –as many
of them, including Simon and Modigliani, were Cowles’ research consultants in the early 1950s–, and
with Henry Theil, who was working at the Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands but visited
Chicago several times in the 1950s and 1960s and was also in contact with the group at GSIA.
In this same period operations research was ﬁrming its scientiﬁc character devoid of strong
military connotations. The Operations Research Society of America (ORSA) was created in 1952, the
same year in which it started publishing the Journal of the Operations Research Society of America5.
It was “then inhabited mostly by mathematicians, physicists, and engineers,” and, according to
Simon (in Ijiri and Whinston (1979, page xxiii)), “did not appear (at least to those of us who were
then outside) too hospitable to econometricians and other social scientists who brought knowledge
of business institutions and marginal analysis to management problems.” An analogous society was
formed in England at that time.
Paralleling the consolidation of operations research as a non-military science, the 1950s also
witnessed the establishment of a scientiﬁc community to deal with increasingly complex managerial
problems. The Institute of Management Sciences (TIMS) was oﬃcially founded in December of 1953,
with the objective of identifying, extending, and unifying “scientiﬁc knowledge that contributes to
the understanding and practice of management,” as stated in its constitution, published in the ﬁrst
issue of TIMS’ journal, Management Science, in 19546. William Wager Cooper, an important ﬁgure
in the present narrative and then a professor at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, was TIMS’
ﬁrst president7.
Among the new management scientists there was a clear desire to distinguish themselves from the
old management practitioners, who, according to them, were problem-oriented. The new scientists
saw in adopting the new mathematical and computational techniques a way to do so, under the
guidance of the Institute of Management Sciences and inﬂuenced by von Neumann8.
It was in the same temper of planning decisions (made by the government or by businessmen)
in an uncertain world through the guide of mathematical models that a quadratic loss function was
introduced, in articles published mainly in journals like Operations Research, Management Science,
but also in Econometrica, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, and The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics9. It was a period in which a “scientiﬁc” and “objective” notion of optimality was con-
programs devoted to industrial and governmental problems, CIT developed and strengthened its ties with the industry
and government. In 1967, the Mellon Institute gave an endowment of $ 60 million to the Carnegie Institute of
Technology leading to the creation of the Carnegie-Mellon University.
4As argued by Klein (2005), the ONR published the Naval Research Logistics Quarterly and was the main insti-
tution ﬁnancing projects on inventory control, as those in the Carnegie Institute of Technology, but also ﬁnanced
a project on the theory of decision-making under uncertainty at Cowles Comission. This project was directed by
Marschack, who invited Simon to collaborate with it (see Koopmans (1952)).
5In 1956, ORSA changed its journal name to Operations Research.
6TIMS and the Operations Research Society of America were merged to create INFORMS, the Institute for
Operations Research and the Management Sciences, in 1995.
7See Cooper’s very illustrative presidential; Cooper (1955, especially page 183).
8See Flood (1956, pages 179-180).
9It is important to emphasize that the focus of the present paper is in how quadratic loss function was incorporated
by monetary economists. To this narrative, the important and vast literature on quadratic objective functions in
econometrics and statistics (like minimizing the sum of the squared residuals, as done in ordinary least squares) is
3structed and used, a notion closely related to economizing resources and information. A feasible
concept of optimality was introduced with quadratic “loss functions,” in line with the main char-
acteristic of operations research: to be “concerned with optimizing the performance of a system
regarded as given for the purpose of the problem” (Halsbury (1955, page 239).)
A quadratic function was understood as an approximation to the “true” objective function and
the conditions necessary for having a good approximation were, in general, carefully discussed in
the seminal papers outside monetary economics. The main advantage of this approximation is that
it renders to the model being built the so-called “certainty equivalence” property, which provides
an easier and feasible way of solving complex dynamic problems. In this period, “good” algorithms
used to solve a model were those that minimize the number of calculations that a computer would
need to execute. This was the main feature of feasibility at that period. Postulating a quadratic
loss function would do the trick and turn diﬃcult problems solvable in computers.
In order to appreciate the diﬀerent meanings of a “loss function,” as it was introduced outside
monetary economics, and how it was deeply connected with the characteristics of the 1950s and
1960s described before, the next two sections discuss the works of Modigliani, Simon, and others at
Carnegie Tech and those of Henri Theil at the Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands.
2.1 Planning Production and Employment at Carnegie Tech
In 1946, William Cooper, who graduated in economics from the University of Chicago in 1938, left his
position as instructor of economics at the University of Chicago during the war (1944-1946) and went
to Carnegie Institute of Technology as a (assistant) professor of economics and management science.
At Carnegie, Cooper, George Leland (Lee) Bach, economics department head, Edward Schatz,
instructor in electrical engineering, and the Carnegie Tech’s Provost Elliot Dunlap Smith devised
“an imaginative undergraduate curriculum in industrial management to replace the old-fashioned
programs in industrial engineering and commercial arts that Carnegie was then oﬀering.”10 William
Larimer Mellon, founder of his family Gulf Oil branch, saw this program as a perfect opportunity
to implement his beliefs about “young men with combined technical and business training in high-
technology industries.”11 The William L. and Mary T. Mellon Foundation donated $ 6 million
to create the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) in 1949, having George Lee
Bach as its ﬁrst dean. Was with this same spirit of grounding the new management science on
mathematical and computational methods that lead Cooper to be one of the founders of the Institute
of Management Science (TIMS), as already mentioned. In 1952 GSIA also started a long-term
cooperation with the Ford Foundation, which ﬁnanced substantial part of the programs in behavioral
sciences and in economic development and administration, for example.
In September of 1949, Cooper brought Herbert Simon, who referred to himself as a “mathe-
matical social scientist”12, from the Illinois Institute of Technology –where he was a professor of
political science– to become a professor of administration and head of the department of industrial
management of Carnegie Tech. Simon’s contributed to consolidate the new program at GSIA. Simon
had a contact with operations research and management problems before he went to GSIA. After
graduating in political science at the University of Chicago in 1936, he was Clarence E. Ridley’s
research assistant on decision-making in the ﬁeld of municipal administration (at the International
City Managers’ Association). After and getting his Ph.D. also in political science at the same uni-
versity in 1942 (Simon (1992)), Simon worked as a consultant to the International City Managers’
Association and the Institute for Training in Municipal Administration from 1942 to late 1940s.
Herbert Simon and William Cooper had a close friendship13 that started at the University of
not relevant and, thus, not considered here.
10Herbert Simon, “A Yankee from Chicago” in Ijiri and Whinston (1979, page xix)
11Simon, in Ijiri and Whinston (1979, page xix).
12Simon (1992). For more on Simon, see Sent (2005) and references therein.
13See Simon in Ijiri and Whinston (1979, page xvii).
4Chicago in the 1930s, when both were undergraduate students there14. Cooper and Simon worked
together in the Bureau of Public Administration, at the University of California, Berkeley15. Later,
in the 1940s, Cooper and Simon attended the seminars at Cowles Commission, at Chicago, 16 and
went to the Carnegie Institute of Technology.
The GSIA at Carnegie Tech was the center of diﬀusion of linear-quadratic techniques to the
military, as well as to government and businessmen17. It was there that many of the main actors in
the present narrative were working and discussing the use of quadratic loss functions in the mid to late
1950s (inﬂuenced, of course, by the work of Arrow et al. (1951) and Bellman18). Franco Modigliani
joined the GSIA in 952, after a three-year period as Associate Professor and Professor of Economics
at the University of Illinois (Chicago). Modigliani already knew Simon (and Koopmans, Marschak,
Arrow, among others) from the period when he was an associate of the Cowles Commission, from
1948 to 1950 approximately. The group composed by Modigliani, Simon, Holt and several of their
graduate students, as Muth, Ando, and many others, worked for about ﬁve years (from 1953 to
almost 1958) to the Oﬃce of Naval Research and produced more than ﬁfty memoranda as part of
their project, called “Planning and Control of Industrial Operations,” contracted with the ONR.
Modigliani stayed at Carnegie Mellon until 1960, when he went to MIT.
In 1953, after spending a year at LSE, Merton Miller joined the GSIA group at Carnegie Institute.
It was there that he started working with Modigliani in the ﬁrst paper of the now known “Modigliani-
Miller Theorem” on corporate ﬁnance. More important to the present paper is the fact that Miller
stayed at Carnegie Institute until 1961, when he went to the University of Chicago. There, he
became Poole’s main advisor. As we shall show, William Poole is a very important actor launching
quadratic loss function in the monetary debate of the 1960s in the U.S. Therefore, it is clear how
important diﬀuser of linear-quadratic methods the group at Carnegie Institute of Technology was,
particularly in monetary economics.
Out of the more than ﬁfty reports produced by the research group at Carnegie Tech, three articles
are of great relevance in the present paper. In the ﬁrst paper, Holt et al. (1955), they discuss the
problem of minimizing the costs imposed to the ﬁrm by the ﬂuctuations in consumer’s orders when
ﬁrms are unable to have precise estimates of their cost functions. They had a paint company as
their case study. The authors ﬁrst formalized carefully and quantiﬁed this decision problem by
using a quadratic cost function. In a second step, they calculated the implied linear decision rule
and showed how production executives could avoid losses (incur lower costs) by employing this rule
instead of “prevailing rule-of-thumb and judgement procedures.”19 The proposed method was easily
implementable and implied more proﬁts to the ﬁrms. What music could be better to businessmen
ears?
Besides providing businessmen an implementable scientiﬁc way of deciding how much to produce
and how much labor to employ, which resulted in lower costs than the actual decision procedure
followed by them, two other characteristics of this ﬁrst paper are important to the present narrative
of the quadratic loss function. The ﬁrst is the use of a quadratic cost function as an approximation
to the “true” function. And the second feature is an speciﬁc criterion to judge how good the
approximation was.
With respect to the ﬁrst characteristic, the authors followed the main idea of the prevailing
operations research and management science approach, that of “optimizing the performance of a
system regarded as given for the purpose of the problem” (Halsbury (1955, page 239)), and instead
14Simon went to the University of Chicago in 1932 and graduated in political science in 1936, while Cooper was a
Chicago student in 1934 and graduated in economics in 1938.
15See: Simon, Divine, Cooper, Chernin. Determining Work Loads for Professional Staﬀ in a Public Welfare Agency.
Berkeley, 1941. Simon published a summary of this report in Public Management, vol. 23, pages 172-175, 1941.
16See Simon in Ijiri and Whinston (1979).
17For more on the research conducted at GSIA in its beginning, see Cooper (2002).
18See Klein (2005) for a detailed discussion about the early works on the “inventory problem.”
19Anshen et al. (1958).
5of having proﬁt maximization as the decision criterion they treated “the scheduling of production
and employment from the point of view of the production manager. We assume that sales volume
and price are beyond his control, so that revenue is given, and the maximization of proﬁts becomes
the minimization of costs. We should emphasize that “costs” are interpreted broadly to include
any relevant considerations to which the decision maker chooses to attach importance.” (Holt et al.
(1955, page 7))
In implementing the cost minimization criterion the authors found convenient to resort on a
quadratic approximation to the cost function, a mathematical form that “is both suﬃciently ﬂexible
to approximate a wide range of complex cost relationships, and suﬃciently simple to allow easy
mathematical solution.” 20. Such a function has the general features the “true” cost function has:
“the cost of inventory is high when inventory is large, and high also at the other extreme when
inventory is so small that there are frequent runouts of particular products which cause back orders
and a high penalty for delayed shipments to customers.”21 Among several functional forms that
matched these features of production cost, the quadratic function perfectly ﬁtted the criterion of
delivering easy mathematical solution, because it generates linear decision rules (for production
and employment, in the present case) with the property of “certainty equivalence.” This property
implies that in order to follow the obtained decision rules the decision maker needs only to know
the expected value of the stochastic variables, but no information about the whole probability
distributions is required.
The second feature of Holt et al. (1955) relevant to the present narrative is the speciﬁc criterion
to evaluate how good the proposed approximation to the cost function is. The authors ﬁrst carefully
justify that the several nonlinear components of the cost of a painting factory studied by them
(cost of hiring and layoﬀs; overtime costs; inventory, back order and machine setup costs) can be
“reasonably” approximated by quadratic functions. Holt et al. (1955, see page 9) discreetly used a
local argument, that the quadratic function “can give a tolerable approximation” over “the range in
which the work force are expected to ﬂuctuate.” However, no mention was made to any argument
like using a Taylor expansion of the true function around a given point, which was common in
mathematics and engineering as a way to simplify some of their problems. However, in the book
they published later, while justifying the use of a quadratic cost function, Holt et al. (1960, page
12) connected their assumption to a broad mathematical literature, including the Taylor expansion,
by stating that they “have used a mathematical decision structure (...) that ﬁts these objectives
[of ﬂexibility, of being a good approximation and easily implementable] and permits us to draw
on a large body of mathematical and statistical theory (linear diﬀerence equations, Taylor series,
Lagrange multipliers, and probability theory).”
However, in contrast to a Taylor-type argument, in which the quality of the approximation of a
given degree depends on the distance of any point to the point of approximation, or to arguments
of “goodness of ﬁt”, Holt et al. (1955, page 15) argued that a good approximation to the decision
problem is that delivering minimal costs.
In the second paper, Holt et al. (1956), now coauthored by John Muth instead of Herbert Simon,
the authors showed how the linear decision rules used in the ﬁrst paper are optimally derived from
a quadratic cost function involving inventory, overtime, and employment costs. Optimality here is
equivalent to minimizing the expected total cost. Besides this, the authors demonstrated how the
numerical coeﬃcients of the rules are computed for any set of cost parameters. This is a much more
technical paper than the ﬁrst one, and the proposed method for solving the derived linear system
of equations is a particular case of the general method developed by Muth (1955), but also with
insights and concerns on the stability of the computational solution coming from Modigliani (1954).
The authors explicitly stated the usefulness of the “certainty equivalence” property and the use of
quadratic loss (cost) functions22.
20Holt et al. (1955, page 7)
21Holt et al. (1955, page 7).
22See Holt et al. (1956, pages 160-161)
6It is important to stress here that the notion of optimality is a notion of economizing information
in a very particular sense. A decision rule is “optimal in the sense that it is the best action that
can be taken on the basis of information currently available” (Holt et al. (1956, page 176)), but the
assumption that the objective or loss function is quadratic waives the decision makers the necessity to
know the whole distribution of the stochastic variables of their model. The only required information
to base an optimal decision are the expected value of the unknown variables. In other words, a
quadratic loss function converts the set of all relevant information currently available (i.e., the whole
distribution of the random variables) into the smaller set of the expected value (ﬁrst moment of the
distributions) of the stochastic variables of the model.
Finally, the third paper from the research group at GSIA discussed here was published in 1958,
in the Harvard Business Review, illustrating their main arguments with the case study of the paint
company23. The purpose of the authors was to persuade their audience (businessmen and academics
related to management science) about the importance of the new mathematical methods that they
employed to solve management problems.
To do so, they verbally explained the main advantages of their method, as well as its limitations,
trying to generalize them as much as possible, with appealing arguments for the period, like: “Better
decisions within a company contribute directly to its proﬁts. Even more broadly, better decisions
in many companies can increase the eﬃciency with which the nation uses its resources –a fact of
growing importance as our arm race with the Soviet Union intensiﬁes.”24 In their conclusion, they
stress that “the general technique is applicable to scheduling in any plant in which the relevant
costs may be approximated by U-shaped curves. Decision problems in areas outside production
would also appear to be candidates for the application of mathematical decision rules of the type
described. (...) And with ingenuity management will undoubtedly discover still other applications
in the future.”25
In conclusion, linear-quadratic methods became the reference to sound decision-making in the
United States, during the 1950s. They were then applied not only to military needs but also reached
a broader audience of social scientists and engineers involved in non-military problems. In the 1960s,
there was a great eﬀort in “bridging the gap” between the quantitative analysis approach used in
those diﬀerent problems and “the process by which governments formulate their economic policies.”26
Holt (1965, pages 254-255, italics in the original) could not be more emphatic in supporting the idea
that quantitative methods should be applied to economic policymaking:
“If the values which are sought by the citizenry and the responsible elected oﬃcials can
be determined –that is if the most abstract ingredient in the decision-making process can
somehow be subjected to objective study and quantitative estimation– the economists can take
an entirely diﬀerent approach in their contributions to the decision-making process.
The problem of maximizing the accomplishment of a welfare function subject to the con-
straint of the economic relationships can be posed. And when the problem is stated in mathe-
matical language it can be solved by formal methods to determine the action alternatives that
are eﬃcient –that is, eﬀective in achieving the desired ends. (...)
(...) This general approach has proved feasible in operations research on business and
military decision problems, and it has the potential to tremendously increase the contribu-
tions of economists to national economic policy. We are not, however, visualizing a benevolent
dictatorial technocracy run by professional economists; rather, we are foreseeing a day when
economists will be better able to oﬀer sound advice on a professional level to politically respon-
sible decision-makers.”
23Anshen et al. (1958), which had a suggestive headline: “Here is another area where the new statistical techniques
can subtract guesswork, add precision, divide risk, and multiply eﬃciency.”
24Anshen et al. (1958, page 51).
25Anshen et al. (1958, page 58).
26Holt (1965, page 252). Theil also contributed to this volume edited by the Brookings Institution, from a conference
of the Social Science Research Committee on Economic Stability on the subject of quantitative planning of economic
policy.
7In the 1950s and 1960s, the main proponents of linear-quadratic (or “quantitative”) methods
in the United States, like Herbert Simon and William Cooper, for example, had a good transit in
military, governmental and industrial circles. In a diﬀerent context, “[a]t this same time, Tinber-
gen and Theil were independently developing very similar techniques for national planning in the
Netherlands”27, dealing with problems of oﬀering “sound advice” to the policy-making authority, as
discussed next.
2.2 Henri Theil and a dictatorial welfare maximizer
Before discussing the contributions of Henri Theil to the subject of quadratic loss functions, welfare
maximization, and certainty equivalence property, a brief sketch of his life in the 1950s and 1960s28,
might enrich their understanding. Theil was born in Amsterdam on October 31, 1924. After being
caught by the Germans and sent to forced labor in a factory in Germany circa 1943, Theil took up
economics and abandoned his ﬁrst studies of chemistry, physics and mathematics at the University
of Amsterdam. However, he followed lectures in mathematical statistics and was an assistant to the
most prominent Dutch statistician, Professor David van Dantzig. He obtained his Ph.D. in 1951,
with a dissertation on inventories and consumer demand theory. In 1952 he started working at the
Central Planning Bureau, where he stayed only for about a year. This oﬃce was an institute for
economic advice to the Dutch government. After that, Theil worked at the International Statistical
Center in Calcutta, India.
In 1953, invited by Jan Tinbergen, Theil took over Tinbergen’s classes in econometrics at the
Netherlands School of Economics, in Rotterdam (now Erasmus University), where he proposed to
start a special program in quantitative economics. Supported by Tinbergen, Theil proposed the
program to the university and the senate of the Netherlands School of Economics agreed, but put
the condition that the program “would not conﬁne itself to economic applications, but would also
give attention to business problems, which implied that operations research had to be included in the
program.” (Kloek (2001, page 264)) However, the ﬁnal authorization was given only in 1957, since
the proposed change required royal consent. In 1955 and early 1956, Theil visited the University
of Chicago, where he also proposed the establishment of a research institute in econometrics, with
the feeling “that at the Central Planning Bureau it was impossible to give adequate attention to
problems of econometric methodology.” (Kloek (2001, page 264)) Again with Tinbergen’s support,
the Econometric Institute started its activities at Chicago in September 1956. In 1966 Theil accepted
a joint appointment at the Graduate School of Business and Department of Economics, at the
University of Chicago.
Once again, the inﬂuence of planning on the economic theory produced at the 1950s and 1960s is
clear. Theil (1954) was obviously involved in advising the Dutch government on economic matters
and took a welfare approach to a static problem, in spite of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, recently
published as a monograph of the Cowles Commission, in 1951 (see Arrow (1951).) This theorem ba-
sically states that the social decision mechanism resulting from the aggregation of rational individual
preferences cannot exhibit the same properties of the latter unless it is dictatorial. This theorem
was questioning that a “well-behaved” social welfare function could be derived from aggregating the
individual utility functions. More important, such a function would have to exhibit the ranking of
only one individual, if it has to exist. Theil (1954, page 61) chose to attribute the government the
dictatorial role and to avoid discussions about the impossibility theorem.
For the story Theil (1954) created to justify the dictatorship role of a government being advised
by economists, these professionals were able to only report consequences of diﬀerent policy actions in
diﬀerent scenarios, with no normative judgement on their (sound) advice. He goes on with his econo-
metric approach to economic decision making by borrowing from Tinbergen (1952) the concept of
instruments, the variables directly controlled by the government, and targets, or “indirect variables”
27Simon (1992).
28See Kloek (2001) and Barnett (2001)
8as he called them, those variables that the government is interested in aﬀecting. With this dis-
tinction Theil represented the policymaking problem as maximizing the “decision-maker’s desires,”
represented by the expected value of a welfare function that has as arguments the “instruments,”
subject to the economy’s behavior, represented as a system of linear equations29.
Therefore, the policymaker’s problem is analogous to the usual consumer’s problem, both repre-
sented as a constrained maximization. Throughout the paper there are several rhetorical comparisons
of the welfare function attributed to the government with the “utility function of the traditional the-
ory of consumer’s behaviour” (Theil (1954, page 64).) Moreover, Theil (1954, page 69), once more
mimicking the consumer’s demand theory, discussed several geometrical representations of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare function for diﬀerent economic policy problems to conclude
that “[i]t appears from the four diagrams that the indiﬀerence curves can presumably be well ap-
proximated, for rather wide intervals, by means of quadratic functions”30
Theil describes two possible approaches to maximizing the welfare of the (dictatorial) govern-
ment. In the ﬁrst, called “choice alternative,” it is assumed that there is no uncertainty and “that
instruments and indirect variables are the arguments of a social welfare function, corresponding to
the preferences of the policy maker” (Theil (1954, page 64, italics in the original).) The second
is the “probability alternatives” approach, in which an econometric (stochastic) model is used to
guide policymakers, who should not only compare the diﬀerent alternatives they face, but should
also attach to each alternative a probability of its occurrence. Economizing the relevant information
required from policymakers also appear in Theil (1954, page 66) when he explained that setting
random variables at their mean was an approach already used in the Central Planning Bureau of
the Netherlands.
In sharp contrast with the case of the research group at Carnegie Tech, we see Theil looking for
a theoretical justiﬁcation to the “trick” already employed at the Central Planning Bureau, that of
arbitrarily setting the random variables at their mean or their mode, to be able to use a stochastic
model to advise governmental decisions. A quadratic objective function, in this case a social welfare
function, was the main hypothesis, among others, delivering the certainty equivalence property31.
However, once again a quadratic function is seen as an “appropriate” approximation which should
be applied with care.
Henri Theil had also contributed to the certainty equivalence-quadratic loss function literature
in other articles and books. In Theil (1957), he shows how the proof derived by Simon (1956) for
the case of a dynamic model can be generalized and simpliﬁed, by following a rather econometric
approach to it. Theil (1961) has a rather methodological approach to the problem of programming
under uncertainty, and he compares diﬀerent approaches to this problem, including the certainty
equivalence case. Further discussion on quadratic loss functions and certainty equivalence property
is found in Theil (1958, 1964). Most of his work, especially his 1964 book and his Econometrica
paper of 1957, together with Simon (1956), became the main references on quadratic loss functions
and certainty equivalence property for monetary economists, as discussed in the next section.
Theil developed his ideas about certainty equivalence while at the Central Planning Bureau
29Theil’s approach diﬀers from to that of Harry Markowitz and his portfolio selection theory. Theil (1961, page 127)
explicitly cites Markowitz’s approach as an exception to the customary assumption that agents maximize expected
utility. Markowitz (1952) understood that, ignoring market imperfections, if investors maximized the expected value of
their objective function (the future dividends of stocks), they would invest all their wealth in a single stock, that with
higher expect return. Such hypothesis should be rejected because “diversiﬁcation is both observed and sensible.” He
thus introduce risk consideration with his idea that investors “consider expected return a desirable thing and variance
of return an undesirable thing” (page 77).
30Theil (1954, pages 75-76). The author seems to argue here that the quadratic welfare function is a good approx-
imation to the “true” function in a global sense, in contrast to the local arguments employed by the group at GSIA,
Carnegie Institute of Technology. However, Theil (1964, pages 4-5) explicitly states that the quadratic function can
be obtained by a second-order Taylor expansion of the “true” function. In this book, he also uses ﬁrst-order Taylor
expansions to prove some of his results, using, therefore, local arguments.
31For a summary of those conditions, see Theil (1954, page 81).
9of Netherlands, under inﬂuence of Tinbergen. Not only the denomination of “instruments” and
“targets” was borrowed from Tinbergen by Theil (as well the general concern of having as many
instruments as targets to achieve), but also his approach of deriving a policy model from a “struc-
tural model of the economy by eliminating the irrelevant endogenous variables.”32 Moreover, Theil
implements Tinbergen’s (1935, page 306) desire of deriving the “optimal” policy in a systematic
way:
“Having indicated, at least in principle, how the consequences of a given business cycle
policy are to be found, we can now enunciate the “last” problem in this ﬁeld, that is, which
policy is the “best” one, the “optimal”? To answer this question, we should dispose of some
general ophelimity function and calculate for which policy a course of events would occur
giving a maximum to this general ophelimity function. Of course, at this moment any practical
calculations of this sort are impossible. I shall not try to give them here.”
Theil (1965, page 19) criticizes the “standard practice of Western countries” in attacking the
decision-maker’s problem “very informally. (...) Intuition and “feeling” are frequently the most
important ingredients of the procedure. The apparatus of economic theory will usually be employed,
of course, but the diﬃculty is that this theory gives little guidance as to the quantitative impact
of the measures taken.” Theil proposed an alternative to this unsatisfactory situation “from the
standpoint of economic analysis” by representing the policymaking as a constrained maximization
problem, with a quantiﬁable (and “objective”) criteria of optimality, as Tinbergen would like to have
available at his time. Economists were ﬁnally able to give sound advice to policy authorities.
In spite of being in the Netherlands in the 1950s and part of the 1960s, Theil did interact
with Simon and the group at GSIA, Carnegie Institute of Technology. In the 1955 he visited the
Carnegie Institute before going to Chicago and, more important, he exchanged letters with Simon
commenting Simon’s papers and memoranda to the ONR, including Simon’s (1956) proof of the
certainty equivalence property in a dynamic model. Theil sent his 1954 paper to Simon in a letter
of June of 1955 (see Theil (1955a)), he also asked Simon to send him a copy of Holt’s paper to him
and to “Professor Verdoorn, also of the Central Planning Bureau, [who] is interested in the same
ﬁeld, and he too would appreciate very much if you could send him copies of the two papers.”33
At that point Simon had already submitted his 1956 paper to Econometrica, what happened
in March of 1955 (see Simon (1955a)). However, the revised and ﬁnal version was sent by Simon
to the journal only in October of that same year (see Simon (1955b)) and he was aware of Theil’s
contribution to the topic34.
The analysis of how quadratic loss functions became used to deliver the desired certainty equiv-
alence property shows that the quadratic function was seen as an approximation to the “true”
objective function. The main attractive was the easily implementable or feasible solutions obtained
in models with quadratic objective function. Quadratic functions were suitable to policymakers
with few time to devote to the decision making process and having no access to joint distributions of
random variables, but only to few of their moments. Besides that, the cases discussed in this section
reveal that diﬀerent meanings of “loss function” were present in the diﬀerent cases, all concretely
speciﬁc to the problems discussed.
Easy analytical solutions and an “objective” way of talking about optimal policies were also very
important elements for monetary economists participating in several debates in the 1960s in the
United States. These elements partially explain the widespread adoption of quadratic loss functions
in monetary debates since late 1960s, as discussed next.
32Hickman (1965, page 8).
33See also Theil (1955b).
34Answering a letter from Robert Strotz, the editor of Econometrica at the time, of September of 1955 with criticisms
from the referees to Simon’s draft, Simon (1955c) by the end wrote: “I will await with interest your decision on the
paper. If it is accepted, I should like to have the manuscript returned so that I can make the change mentioned above,
and insert a reference to the Theil paper which was called to my attention after I had submitted the manuscript. In
any event, I hope a decision can be reached with somewhat greater speed than was in evidence on the ﬁrst round.”
103 The leading actors in the monetary debate
The “instrument contend” and its approach through assuming a quadratic loss function were more
than mere theoretical curiosities. The period after the World War II witnessed the “increasing use
of professional economists in government, not only in the Council of Economic Advisers but as
presidential aides, specialists throughout the executive branch, and even as cabinet oﬃcers”35 in
the United States. The point is not that American economists started discussing policy issues, but
rather that they did it inside the “government system, especially the executive branch,” as stressed
by Goodwin and Herren in Goodwin (1975, page 35).
At the same time, in the 1950s and 1960s, every president of the United States “has faced inﬂation
as a major problem of his administration and has to construct a policy for its solution,”36 keeping
an eye on unemployment and the balance of payment consequences of such policies.
The administration of President John Kennedy (1961-1963) “brought a new level of involvement
of professional economists to the top ranks of the executive branch of government”37. Kennedy’s
ﬁrst Council of Economic Advisers had Walter Heller as chairman (from 1961 to 1964) and Kermit
Gordon and James Tobin as members38. Robert Solow and Arthur Okun were part of the Council
staﬀ and contributed with reports and discussions of diﬀerent topics. Paul Samuelson and Walt
Rostow also contributed to the discussions about the main goal of Kennedy’s economic policy,
especially the wage-price policy39.
During the 1950s, Seymour Harris organized the Treasury consultants’ meetings, strengthening
the communication and interaction between professional economists and the Treasury. After this
successful initiative, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System arranged a small-scale
version of the Treasury consultants’ meetings. At that point, the Board felt that, “while it is in
close and active contact with ﬁnancial and business groups in the community, it has not had very
eﬀective contact with academic economists on monetary issues. The main purpose of these informal
sessions, therefore, would be to give the academic economists a chance to say what we think on some
of the important issues facing the Board, and to give the Board members a chance to explore these
views with us.”40
Franco Modigliani participated in several academic consultants’ meetings in the Federal Reserve
Board since 1964 (until early 1980s). Several times Tobin, Poole, Samuelson, and Friedman, among
several others, were invited to discuss diﬀerent monetary issues.
The idea that economists should ﬁnd the “optimal” instrument for monetary policy was partly
a reaction to the understanding that monetary policy could, in ﬁrst place, be used to keep the
economy close to a desired path. This was one of the four main features that, according to Tobin
(1974), characterized the “new economics” brought to Washington in the early 1960s41. The other
three novelties were the conviction that, against the Mitchell-Burns-Moore tradition, business cycles
were not inevitable and that government policy could and should keep the economy close to a path
if steady real growth at a constant target rate of unemployment; the elimination of the taboo on
deﬁcit spending and an active use of ﬁscal and monetary policies mix to reach long-run goals; and
35Craufurd Goodwin in Goodwin (1975, page 6).
36Craufurd Goodwin in Goodwin (1975, page 1).
37Idem.
38Tobin (1974, page 6, footnote 3) adds that “when I returned to Yale in August 1962, I was replaced by Gardner
Ackley. But I maintained close consulting relations with the Council for several more years.”
39See Barber in Goodwin (1975).
40Bach (Bach). Bach was then a professor at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business and was asked by the Board
to organize the academic meetings.
41As stated by Tobin (1974, page 6): “[t]he economics brought to Washington by the Kennedy Council of Economic
Advisers and other academic economists close to the new President was not new to economic literature and classrooms.
It was not new in the practice of governments in Scandinavia, Holland, and Britain. Much of it was not new to oﬃcial
doctrine in this country, having been set forth by the ﬁrst Councils of Economic Advisers, chaired by Edwin Nourse
and Leon Keyserling for President Truman, and, in lesser degree, by the Eisenhower Councils as well. But it was new
to Washington nonetheless.”
11a growth-oriented policy prescription.
The recent literature on the “instrument problem” and the characterization of the central bank’s
behavior by means of quadratic loss functions42 generally tend to cite Sargent and Wallace (1975)
as the seminar paper on this topic. Sargent and Wallace (1975), on their turn, followed a strategy
used by Poole (1970) (and Poole (1970) only, not Sargent and Wallace (1975), cites Theil (1964) to
justify the assumption of a quadratic loss function43).
William Poole, as already anticipated, was a Chicago Ph.D. student. He graduated in 1966
having Merton Miller as the chair of his thesis committee. Miller was at Carnegie Tech before going
to the University of Chicago in 1961. Poole was an economist of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System from 1969 to 1970, when he became senior economist, position occupied
until 1974. In this period he was also lecturing at The American University (1970-1971) and at
George Washington University (1971-1973), as well as Harvard (fall of 1973). In 1969 he published a
version of his 1970 paper as a working paper of the Federal Reserve Board (see Poole (1969)), which
is practically the same version published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. He also discussed
a ﬁrst draft of his paper at the December 1967 meetings of the Econometric Society.
Poole (1970) compared three types of monetary policy: one that uses interest rate as instrument
and another that has a monetary aggregate as instrument and another which is a combination of
the previous two. He used an IS-LM framework to show that the “instrument problem” can only
be properly analyzed in a stochastic model since in a static model all instruments are equivalently
optimal. Then, in a stochastic version of the IS-LM model, Poole (1970) discussed the conditions
upon which a given instrument is “optimal”. He concluded that this is an empirical issue and that
it depends on several parameters of the model, among them the variances of the diﬀerent shocks
disturbing the economy. This means that the choice of the instrument depends on the type of
uncertainty faced by policymakers.
Poole (1970) was not the only one to approach the “instrument problem” with a quadratic loss
function. Kareken (in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1969, pages 57-63)) has the same approach
as Poole (1970) and the same type of conclusion: that the choice of the instrument depends on the
type of uncertainty hitting the economy. In fact, Kareken was verbally arguing what he had proven
in a paper not published already at that time, but available from him upon request. This paper,
which is in fact a short note, was published in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking in 1970
(see Kareken (1970).) In the particular case that “the monetary authority is certain about the values
of the structural coeﬃcients”, the optimality condition is the same as Poole’s: the policy leading to
the lowest variance.
What is most relevant is the fact that an “objective” way of talking on optimal monetary policy
arouse with the linear-quadratic approach. Objectivity here is used in the sense of what Daston
(1992) denominated “aperspectival objectivity” and in the sense of Porter (1994): a standard way of
exchanging knowledge and approaching a given problem so that individual idiosyncracies (or from a
group of individuals) are eliminated. The main conclusion of Kareken (1970) is that no matter how
economists believe the economy works the method he proposed should be always applied to judge
what policy is optimal.
“What I have done then in this note is (by example) suggest a procedure for deciding how
the System [i.e., the Federal Reserve] should operate. Nor is fatal that economists are not all
agreed on the structure of the U.S. economy. Whatever structure has been estimated,
the procedure I have suggested can be used.”
Kareken (1970, page 390, emphasis added)
42For references on the vast recent literature on quadratic loss functions, see Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2003)
and references therein. It is important to stress that part of the current literature on quadratic loss function, as
Woodford (2003), justiﬁes its employment as a second-order Taylor approximation to the “true” welfare function of
the economy, in general given by the representative consumer’s utility function. It is clear that this argument has a
diﬀerent nature than those supported by the group at Carnegie Tech and much closer to Theil (1964).
43However, Sargent and Wallace (1975) cite Chow (1970) who cites Theil (1958) and Holt et al. (1960).
12In contrast to Poole (1970) and Kareken (1970), Sargent and Wallace (1975) were concerned
with the problem that diﬀerent monetary instruments have diﬀerent implications to the existence of
equilibrium in a model, depending on the type of public’s expectations about prices considered, if
rational or adaptative expectations. Their main conclusion is that under rational expectations the
probability distribution of output is the same for all deterministic money supply rules adopted by
the government, while interest rate rules, in this case, lead to price level indeterminacy. They also
show that the opposite result holds for the case of adaptative expectations.
However, more than their results, two other features of their paper are important to the present
narrative. Sargent and Wallace (1975) set up an ad hoc stochastic model with structure somewhat
similar to the IS-LM model, but with dynamic equations involving lagged variables. The essence
of the model is the same that Sargent was recently working on (see Sargent (1971) and Sargent
and Wallace (1973)): it was a linear model. Moreover, they deﬁned optimality according with the
minimization of a quadratic loss function, with the following justiﬁcation:
“In order to discuss policy within the context of an ad hoc model, we must adopt an ad
hoc loss function. The most familiar such function is the quadratic loss function.”
Sargent and Wallace (1975, page 244)
Sargent and Wallace (1975) were here following a type of argument that became common after
Lucas’ (1976) critique, that a model should be “derived explicitly from a theory in which agents
optimize subject to constraints,” so to make possible “to apply the standard welfare economics based
on Pareto optimality” (Muench and Wallace (1974, page 331)44.) In the absence of such a model,
“some ad hoc criterion must be adopted” as currently done in the control theory literature with the
assumption of a quadratic loss function.
This search for macro models of policy analysis based on microfoundations is an important
element for a historical account of the recent literature on quadratic loss function, as Woodford
(2003) for example. However, such account is out of the scope of the present work. The focus here
is rather in how diﬀerent economists employed the quadratic loss function to support a particular
monetary policy characterized as “optimal” in the 1960s (and early 1970s).
Among economists involved in policymaking in the 1960s, there were two broad groups. The
monetarists, with Friedman, Kareken, and Poole, among others, and the “anti-monetarists”, like
Tobin, Modigliani, Okun, and Solow, for example. The dispute among them about the role of
money in the economy was described by Friedman (in Taylor (2001, page 120)) as the “radio AM/FM
debates [Ando and Modigliani versus Friedman and Meiselman].” There was also a clear distinction
between monetarists and the so-called “Yale Tradition” in macroeconomics. As Tobin and Shiller
argue (in Colander (1999)), this tradition referred to people around Tobin, with a sharply diﬀerent
understanding of how the economy operates than that of the monetarists. Nonetheless, a quadratic
loss function was taken as a mere tool to evaluate alternative policies for all these economists. Tobin
(in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1969, pages 79-80)) stated that the procedure Kareken was using
to evaluate diﬀerent monetary policies was correct, is spite of disagreeing with his representation of
the way the economy works:
“(...) I think John is going about the problem the right way, namely, to try to ﬁnd some
rules of policymaking that will minimize the variance of the objective of Federal Reserve policy
around its target. He contrasted two policies – one was to ﬁx M and the other was to ﬁx
interest rates – and he asked under what circumstances can you say one of them is preferable
to the other. (...)
One problem with Kareken’s model is that it assumes that the Federal Reserve can know
the structure well enough to know, on the average, what combination of quantity of money and
reserves will produce what interest rate and will be geared to the target for GNP. (...) The
actual problem the Federal Reserve faces is more complicated.”
44Lucas’ critique was already known by Muench and Wallace (1974), who cites his article as (to be) published in
the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking in 1973. However, Lucas’ article was only published later, in 1976.
13Another interesting example is Okun (1972) with his somewhat length discussion on several
of the intertwined arguments about economic policymaking mentioned in the introduction of the
present article. He carefully supported the activist way of conducting monetary policy and had no
concerns in assuming a quadratic “pain or welfare loos” function. Okun mentioned that a modular
function would also work to get a version of the certainty equivalence in qhich the random variables
are set to their median, rather than the mean. Moreover, Okun (1972) dismissed the monetarist
proposal of a constant money growth on the grounds that this policy does not deliver the lowest
welfare loss. He presented a numerical exercise in which he used a simpliﬁed version of the St.
Louis Fed econometric model, “because [it] represent[s] the most thorough and carefully articulated
quantiﬁcation of the monetarist view,”45 and a quadratic loss function with the deviation of output
to its target as argument. Okun (1972, page 151, italics in original) concludes that a policy maker
“should not keep monetary growth steady, but rather should step it up when GNP falls below the
target path and reduce it when GNP exceeds the target.”
Curiously enough, Okun’s paper was discussed by Kareken and Charles Holt, among others. As
reported by the journal46, in the general discussion, “Holt stressed the need to develop formal tools
for implementing an activist policy, combining and complementing them with judgemental devices.
Formalizing the decision problem requires an objective statement of the various targets and the
relative weight placed on them and of the penalties associated with various instruments. Delving
into those issues would help distinguishing the areas in which we can deal with the various problems
by formal decision rules from those in which we have an intuitive grasp of problems that we cannot
quantify precisely.”47 Okun agreed with Holt’s comments.
Therefore, we see a group of economists (Tobin, Okun, and Kareken, for instance) that disagreed
in several aspects about how to conduct the monetary policy, all seemed to accept or approve that
a quadratic loss function was the “right way” to characterize an optimal policy. In this respect, it
is not possible to associate the use of quadratic loss functions with only a particular argument or
group of participants of the monetary debate in the 1960s, as Poole (1975) tried to do48
The consensual view among Tobin, Okun, Poole, Kareken, and Sargent and Wallace, for example,
about the way to characterize an “optimal” policy did not imply that the quadratic loss function was
unanimously seen as a perfect approximation to the policymaker’s problem. Such function treats
symmetrically positive and negative errors of the same magnitude: a policymaker equally dislikes
and output 10% above its target as one 10% below. Formal criticisms to the symmetry implicit in the
assumption of a quadratic welfare function were arising in economics in the 1970s, as suggested by
the papers of Friedman (1972) and Waud (1976). Some might argue that Brainard (1967) was also
criticizing the “standard approach” of quantitative policy evaluation, which can be characterized as
assuming a quadratic loss function and that uncertainty enters the model only through stochastic
disturbances. In fact, the author called attention for a more complex problem (already discussed by
Theil (1964)): that of an uncertain response of target variables to policy instruments (what Friedman
(1953b) called the “multiplier uncertainty”). His conclusion, a Markowitz-type argument, is that,
in this case, the optimal policy implies diversiﬁcation of instruments, i.e., it uses all instrument
available even in the case of only one target. It is worth pointing that Brainard (1967, page 413)
45Okun (1972, page 150).
46The Brookings Papers on Economic Activity has the habit of publishing the main paper and the comments and
discussion following it. In this part, it publishes the text of the speciﬁed discussants of the paper and also notes on
the general discussion with the audience.
47Okun (1972, page 152).
48For the author, the lack of a “package of reforms in the macro area” in the CEA Report of 1975 “reﬂects two
failures in macro policy analysis in the economic profession in general. The ﬁrst is that the advocates of discretionary
policy have generally refused to be pinned down on formulations of optimal policy reaction function. (...). There is
no hope of improving discretionary policy without the explicit speciﬁcation of policy reaction functions that are to be
followed until evidence accumulates that better policies are available.” (Poole (1975, page 547)) Okun (1972) would
probably be identiﬁed as member of the advocates of discretionary policies (or an anti-rules), but he does support his
argument with a quadratic loss function, as shown before.
14followed “Theil in assuming that the policy-maker maximizes the expected value of a quadratic
utility function”49. However, all those arguments did not prevent the use of quadratic loss functions
to be long lived.
There is an interesting question to explore: why did Modigliani, Tobin, and Friedman, for ex-
ample, avoid to use systematically formalize the discussion about monetary policy in the 1960s in
terms of a quadratic loss function (in spite of not opposing to its employment in this discussion in
which they participated actively)? One argument is that the quadratic loss function (and the cer-
tainty equivalence derived from it) was a new mathematical tool dominated by “young” economists
trained in a “diﬀerent tradition” than that of Modigliani, Tobin, and Friedman. However, this is
hardly supportable. Modigliani was obviously deeply familiar with linear-quadratic methods that
he and the group at Carnegie Tech applied to the inventory problem. Tobin was in close contact
with Brainard and Okun who did discuss, in some occasions, the optimal monetary policy in terms
of a quadratic loss function. Friedman, on the other hand, was involved with operations research
problems at the Statistical Research Group, at Columbia University, during the World War II. It was
there that he was familiarized with the quadratic loss function and the linear-quadratic methods, as
he explained in a letter to the author (Friedman (2005))50.
Yet another argument that is hardly supportable is that the notion of optimality embedded in
the quadratic approach was the only one available at that time. This was clearly not the case.
For example, Bailey (1956), following lines advanced by Friedman (1953a) and strongly associated
to Friedman (1968), had a welfare approach to monetary policy, by arguing that the way to judge
alternative policies could be by assessing the diﬀerent levels of inﬂation they would generate. Inﬂation
was not seen as a painless way of ﬁnancing government expenditures, but rather as a tax imposed to
consumers. However, that was not a suﬃciently attractive way of discussing short-run alternatives
to monetary policymaking at that period51.
Another possible answer to the question previously stated is that Modigliani, Tobin, and Fried-
man were able to discuss “optimal” monetary policy in term of minimizing variances and of tradeoﬀs
between unemployment and inﬂation, as summarized by a Phillips curve. All this could be casted
in the form of a quadratic function in deviations of output from its target and deviations of inﬂation
from its target. Flexibility of this mathematical apparatus to interpret “optimality” and “stabi-
lization” is key here. The relative weight of these arguments is exactly related to the mentioned
tradeoﬀ. As Poole (1970) and Kareken (1970) ﬁrst argued, the optimal instrument is that delivering
the lowest variance of output.
Moreover, an argument about ﬁnding a policy that minimizes the variance of economic variables
(such as inﬂation and output) would hardly sound “unnatural” to economists discussing economic
policymaking and advising policy authorities. In fact, “in the most general (nonoperational) sense,
the goal of macroeconomic policy is clear and undisputed. It is to keep the economy as close as
possible to some desired path of evolution.”52 It is the same idea as that stabilizing the business
cycle “with respect to a certain number of key variables, all of which are measured quantitatively.”53
49So that he would be able “to compare our ﬁndings directly with the familiar certainty equivalence results.”
50When asked if he was familiar and in accordance with the quadratic function and why had he never employed
this approach to the “instrument contest” of the 1960s, Friedman (2005) wrote: “I must confess that in the 1960s I
did not get much involved in considering the quadratic approach to debates about the optimal monetary instrument.
The quadratic approach was familiar to me from the operations research during the war, but somehow or other I
do not remember ever having seriously explored its use for the purpose of monetary policy. (...) I never made a
conscious decision whether to employ the quadratic approach or not. If a problem had come up for which that seemed
an appropriate approach, I probably would have used it but I have no recollection of thinking about the subject in a
systematic way.”
51See, for example, Chow (1970, page 301).
52Holbrook and Shapiro (1970, page 40).
53Theil (1965, page 18). Just as another example, Tinbergen (1935, page 306), after recognizing that calculating
what policy would maximize a general ophelimity function was then impossible, stated: “I shall only make some
remarks on the frequent and, I think, justiﬁable assumption that stabilization of business cycles in employment is the
optimum policy.”
15In conclusion, one might think that the analytic simplicity provided by a quadratic loss function
was the main attractiveness for its widespread usage in monetary economics. No doubt that this
was an important factor. However, I think that the ability of talking about minimizing variances
and about unemployment-inﬂation tradeoﬀ was an equaling appealing property of that quadratic
function, which became a widespread tool employed to discuss optimality in monetary economics.
Monetary economists could disagree in terms of how the economy works, but not in terms of how
to evaluate a monetary policy adopted by the government. To use Weintraub’s (1991, page 120)
words, “I want to suggest that there is another way that the sequence of papers” on quadratic loss
function and certainty equivalence property “can be read, and that is as an attempt, by members of
a particular community, to narrow the possibilities for disagreement among community members.”
4 Concluding Remarks
Given that Sargent and Wallace (1975) is considered to be a seminal paper in the “instrument
contend” literature and that it followed Poole (1970), who cites Theil (1964), the history of quadratic
loss function in the monetary debate seems to start with these papers and book. In fact, an economist
making a literature review on this topic might likely argue that the ﬁrst insights on how to deal
with economics decisions in an uncertain world came from Simon (1956) and Theil (1957), both
article published in an important economics journal, Econometrica. However, as showed in the
second section of this paper, such account misses important nuances coming from how mathematical
methods made their way from military to industrial and governmental uses during the 1950s and
the 1960s in the United States.
Additionally, this narrative also misses the important dynamics among the three competing
neoclassical “schools”, according to Hands and Mirowsky (in Morgan and Rutherford (1998, pages
260-292)), MIT, Chicago, and Cowles Commission, on one hand, and Carnegie Institute of Tech-
nology, on the other. The research group at GSIA, which was in contact with Cowles and Chicago,
clearly stands out as a center disseminating linear-quadratic methods not only for industrial and
governmental uses, but also to professional monetary economists discussing the optimal policy de-
sign54.
During the 1950s and the 1960s there was a great interaction between economists and other
scientists, as the newly grouped management scientists. It was common to see cooperation among
them and one publishing in the journals of the other. Modigliani, Simon, Cooper are just few among
several examples. This period witnessed the emergence of the industrial use of linear programming
and the quadratic approach to maximize the performance of a given system. Economizing resources
and information, in the particular way of minimizing the set of relevant information to base an
optimal decision, was a main characteristic of such a period of intense planning.
Clearly, the feasibility introduced by linear-quadratic methods in dynamic programming prob-
lems under uncertainty was one important attractive for launching them into monetary economics.
However, one should not forget that these methods became widespread in monetary economics ex-
actly in a period when professional economists started to be massively used in government, mainly in
the executive branch. At the same time, since World Ward II, mathematics, stochastic models under
uncertainty, and quantiﬁcation were elements highly appreciated by decision scientists in general,
and (orthodox) economists willing to give sound and objective advice to policymakers in particular.
Linear-quadratic models was then seen as a great opportunity to potentially provide policymakers a
laboratory in which they could test alternative policies, following speciﬁc rules and criteria to judge
them:
“Through simulation testing we can compensate, at least partially, for the fact that the
laboratory for these decision problems is the national economy where any errors will necessarily
54The group at Carnegie Tech was also important in the development of the rational expectation hypothesis, as
developed by Sent (2002) and references therein.
16be large. We can set up an economic model on a computer and perform experiments with various
alternative actions. An extensive testing program of this type is strongly to be recommended
to validate the model, the welfare function, and the decision analysis.”
Holt (1965, page 264)
Moreover, the ﬂexibility of a loss function to encompass “traditional” arguments in monetary de-
bates, as minimizing variance and as the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoﬀs, was an equally appealing
feature of a quadratic loss function.
If the literature outside monetary economics was careful in pointing out possible limitations of a
quadratic loss function, monetary economists saw themselves creating an objective tool for discussing
optimality. It was not uncommon to ﬁnd statements such as the one of Sargent and Wallace (1975)
presented in the previous section, that an ad hoc model calls for an ad hoc loss function, or such as:
“Despite well-known objections, I assume that the monetary authority’s utility function is
U = −(y − ˜ y)2
where y is nominal output for the policy period and ˜ y is the desired or target value of y.”
Kareken (1970, page 385)
Quadratic loss function was a tool to be employed in any model. Objectivity has arisen in
monetary economics. Diﬀerent from the other scientists using quadratic loss function in the 1950s
and 1960s, monetary economists disregarded possible limitations and had an uniﬁed understanding of
a “loss function.” The discourse on optimality, to use Weintraub’s (1991) concept, has stabilized. If
such a function was previously related to the time wasted in scheduling tasks or with the production
costs, “loss function” for monetary economists was merely a uniform description of central bank’s
preferences, so that optimality could be characterized in a objective and quantiﬁable way.
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